Abstract
Introduction
The public administration literature provides an enormous number of studies on decentralisation, but research focused on decentralisation in Pakistan within the context of military rule is limited. Some researchers, mostly belonging to international development agencies, have studied different aspects of the Devolution of Power Plan (DOPP) -sectoral, political etc., but these do not comprehensively cover the breadth of the local government reforms of 2001. The main thrust of this article is that the DOPP was not simply another local government system per se, but rather a major attempt at decentralisation accompanied by a comprehensive package of reforms that had several strandselectoral reform, local government structures and processes, and changes to the police and bureaucracy -all aimed at modernisation and social change.
Pakistan's political history has been characterised by intermittent military rule. Since independence in 1947, there have been four periods of martial law under different dispensations and three constitutions have been enacted (1956, 1962 and 1973) . Cumulatively, military governments have ruled for almost half of Pakistan's existence since 1947. The alternating pattern of political and military governments 1 has affected the structure and design of local government systems, and more importantly has had significant implications for the development of grassroots democracy. It has at times strengthened and at other times jeopardised the sustainability of local government in the country. In broad terms, local democracy has been nurtured by military governments whereas during civilian rule it has been replaced by non-participatory, unelected local structures that are run by government-appointed civil servants. Thus as far as local government is concerned, it may be said that the country has experienced both 'dictatorial democracy' and 'democratic dictatorship'.
According to Briscoe (2008) , the formal state structure in any society may have a parallel or 'shadow' set of institutions that hold real power. This is especially true in the case of Pakistan. Every military government in Pakistan has introduced its own brand of local government. Cheema et al (2005) have used the term 'non-representative governments' for these military regimes. They have attempted to analyse the Pakistani experience to find answers to the question of why non-representative regimes have been willing proponents of decentralisation to the local level. In developing countries decentralisation may be either externally driven (e.g. through structural adjustment programs, donor pressure etc.) or internally motivated (e.g. by governments seeking to strengthen their legitimacy and gain popularity), though the country context is different in each case. In Pakistan's case decentralisation has always been internally driven, and Cheema et al (2005) conclude that the military's need to legitimise its control appears to be a prime reason behind the recurring attempts at local government reform. Bhave and Kingston (2010) view the military in Pakistan as a separate actor with its own interests. It can, however, be argued that institutional 'interest' and institutional 'role' are two different things, and that the course taken will vary according to the institution's interpretation of the context in which it has to operate. According to Sivaramakishnan (2000) local government in South Asia often tends to be stronger during eras of authoritarian rule than in times of democratic rule. He suggests that during democratic regimes elected local government is less attractive because it provides an additional platform for citizen participation, and hence may to some degree rival the centre.
The patronage of local governments under military regimes is not unique to Pakistan. In many countries military governments have attempted to create grassroots popularity and support, and to secure their legitimacy and a better external (and internal) image by nurturing local governments. In the Commonwealth, there are at least two more instances, Ghana and The Gambia, where army rulers introduced local government reforms. In Ghana, a major change in the governance system was introduced in 1988 by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, the organiser of the fourth coup in the country in 1981. Writing about Ghana, Ahwoi (2010) 
Local government in Pakistan until 2001
In 1947, on the eve of independence, Pakistan inherited the local government system of colonial India. The British Administration had introduced the concept of 'local self-government' by creating a separate tier to administer civic functions, initially through appointed local administrators, and then through elected Municipal and District Boards for urban and rural areas respectively. This system was first introduced in Bengal and Madras, followed by Bombay, Punjab and other colonial states.
Separate laws were enacted in each state for large cities, municipal cities and towns, and rural areas (Alam 1999) . During the independence movement in India national political parties stood for greater representation at central and provincial levels rather than local government. This prompted the British government to grant autonomy at the provincial level (Cheema et al 2005) , and was a major factor in the weak development of local governments in the areas that later became Pakistan (Ali 1980 1947 -1958 1958 -1969 , the 'Basic Democracy' system of General Ayub Khan 1969 -1979 1979 -1988 , the local government system introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq.
-1958
As explained above, at the time of independence the areas that constituted Pakistan had few developed systems of local government and the local bodies were mostly run by government appointed administrators. The early years of independence were marked by limited constitutional development and the extreme pressures on limited resources brought about by partition. The partition of India in itself was phenomenal, and perhaps unique in the British Empire, as no other colony was partitioned at the time of granting independence. In Pakistan, migration of millions of Muslims from the Indian states and their settlement was in itself enough for the newly created country to handle, with minimal infrastructure and resources, without trying to focus on other developmental issues such as establishing democratic local government.
Around 1956, some progress began towards creating an adult franchise and electing local office bearers, but this was confined mainly to the provinces of Bengal (now Bangladesh) and Punjab. In 1957-58, half the municipal councils in West Pakistan (the present Pakistan) were still managed by government appointed administrators as in most cases elections had not been held after the expiry of their terms of office. Waseem (1994) points out that even where elections were held, there was only a limited franchise and massive malpractice.
-1969: the Basic Democracy System of General Ayub Khan
This was the first period of martial law that brought with it a 'first wave' of local government reform.
The 'Basic Democracy' (BD) system was the first experiment in Pakistan with local government under the auspices of a military regime. Field Martial Ayub Khan introduced a system of 'controlled democracy' at all levels of government. Under this system, local government institutions were created in rural and urban areas through separate legislation. All urban and rural councils, as well as provincial and national assemblies, were elected indirectly through an electoral college consisting of 40,000 'Basic Democrats' popularly elected in each of East and West Pakistan.
-1979
After the imposition of the 'civilian The special features of the 1979 local government system can be described as follows:
Local government laws relating to rural and urban areas were unified and harmonized
Representation was given to peasants, workers, women and minorities in pursuance of principles laid down under the 1973 Constitution
Elections to local councils were held on non-party basis
Local governments had elected officer bearers (chairmen, mayors, etc.) and there were no appointed members
Local councils had significant autonomy e.g. could approve their own budgets and taxation proposals. Tables 1 and 2 summarise some of the key features of the three systems of local government introduced under military rule, and the intervening 'political' (civilian) governments. Basic Democracy National law; local governments comprised both elected and appointed members, and served as an electoral college for the election of the national President.
1979-1988 9 General Zia-ulHaq
No specific name Elected local governments under provincial laws; no appointed members; 3-4 successful terms completed under this system.
1999-2008 9 General Pervez Musharraf Devolution of Power Plan
Based on the principle of subsidiarity; radical departure from all previous systems; devolution accompanied by taxation, civil service, electoral and police reforms. 
-1976 First elected national/ provincial governments
Despite promulgation of a local government law, no elections held throughout this period and local councils were managed through official administrators.
-1999 Several elected national governments held power
All elected local governments dismissed. Local government elections never held though announced and scheduled several times; elections held in certain provinces in 1998, but elected representatives never assumed office.
The Devolution of Power Plan (DOPP): What was new?
Although (DOPP) was a radical departure as it was based on the concept of subsidiarity, involving transfer of power from provinces to districts and other lower levels. Before the DOPP, subsidiarity was not a commonly used term in developmental discussions and in the corridors of power in Pakistan.
The DOPP had two main elements: decentralisation and electoral reforms. Devolution was also accompanied by reforms to the civil service and police. Features introduced for the first time in the history of Pakistan are summarised in 
Application of subsidiarity
Although the 2001 system sought to apply the principle of subsidiarity, 5 Even though this was not fully implemented and many details were not resolved, especially in relation to financial decentralisation and relationships between provincial and local governments. Nevertheless, the DOPP can be said to have brought about some of the most fundamental changes in governance and local governance in Pakistan since independence in 1947.
Under the 2001 system, district governments (the upper tier) were given responsibilities in agriculture, health, education, community development, information technology, finance and planning, together with revenue previously held by the provinces, and became financially competent through transferred 5 The concept of subsidiarity is that lower levels of government are closer to the citizen and can therefore make more 'intelligent' decisions about 'who does what' ie less about politics and more about principles. The Aberdeen Agenda on local democracy, adopted by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum, provides that local government should have appropriate powers in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
funds and local taxes. Town/taluka governments (the middle tier) were assigned most of the functions of the former municipal authorities as the main providers of essential services (e.g water, sanitation, roads and waste disposal). The union councils (lowest/third tier) were envisaged as providing monitoring and oversight of service delivery, as well as undertaking small developmental projects.
Union councils received funds directly from the district and collected some local taxes.
Abolition of rural-urban divide
One of the important distinguishing features of the DOPP was that it abolished the previous ruralurban divide in local government. Under the British system of administration urban local councils were established to provide essential municipal services, but the capacity of rural councils in service delivery was far less (Siddiqui 1992) as they provided only limited representation, often strengthening the local elite.
Reform of the bureaucracy
The DOPP was a bold attempt to transform an over-centralised bureaucracy, especially in terms of the established elite. The District Coordination Officer (DCO) of the district government, equivalent to a chief executive officer, was placed under the elected mayor. Likewise, the Superintendent of Police of the district reported to the mayor on the overall maintenance of law and order.
Developmental planning
Before the DOPP, the planning system was centralised and development funds were distributed to provincial departments through a top-down mechanism. The identification, appraisal, and approval of development projects had no relationship to local priorities. The element of community participation was missing from the process, which was non-transparent and inequitable. Politicians, mainly parliamentarians of national and provincial assemblies, were provided development funds to be spent according to their wishes.
The DOPP provided for Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) to mobilise the community in the development and improvement of service delivery through voluntary and self-help initiatives. CCBs played a major role in the transformation of development planning by creating a sense of ownership.
They were given the legal right to enable citizens to participate actively in development activities, plus an earmarked budget that could be carried over from year to year. This also introduced transparency and accountability to the development process as communities became active participants in projects instead of being passive beneficiaries.
Organised local government-a new phenomenon in Pakistan
Before 
Social dimensions
One of the significant features of DOPP was the attempt to make social change part of the reforms.
According to Randall and Strasser (1981) 'social changes' are those that mark the transition from one stage or phase of a construed cycle of development to another. They designate as 'significant' those changes that evolutionary theorists associate with the movement of social forms or a whole society from a 'less advanced' state towards a durable 'advanced' state, or from one level or epoch to another.
The definition of 'significant' will depend on the aspect of society or the segment of social reality that is seen to be of strategic importance. For example, reforms in local government institutions may be significant both as a process of strengthening local democracy and as a way of providing better and more efficient services for economic, social and cultural development. Montiel (1988) argued that the institutional development of local government is politically and culturally bounded, therefore its context and process need to be considered accordingly.
Against that background, this section examines some of the social factors and trends exhibited in the two local government elections -2001 and 2005 -held under the DOPP. For this purpose reliance has been placed on secondary data and published sources. PATTAN 6 carried out substantial work in collecting data from the two elections and here we rely on their data (PATTAN 2006) , plus other sources where available (see also Bari 2001) .
As shown in Table 3 , the DOPP incorporated significant electoral reforms. First and foremost, the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 years in order to increase the involvement of young people.
Secondly, minimum educational qualifications were established, including having reached matriculation in order to take the position of District Mayor (Nazim). PATTAN's analysis shows that in the 2005 elections most of the candidates indicated they had first or higher degrees. Approximately 46% claimed to be graduates while 30% said that they had higher or professional degrees. About 15% had completed their FA/FSc -equivalent to 12 years of schooling -while only 10% were educated below that level (Table 4 ). In Pakistan, women have been contesting elections for national and provincial assemblies as well as local governments since independence. However, their representation remained very low due to socioreligious factors. In order to bring women into politics, the DOPP increased the number of reserved seats to 33% at all levels. Previously only 5% of seats were reserved for women in local councils.
Thus the DOPP created about 24,000 seats for women in local governments across the country. In some parts of NWFP and Balochistan, due to social conservatism, women were not allowed to take part in the elections. However, such cases were few. Election figures showed that on the whole the provision of reserved seats had encouraged women to participate in the political affairs of the country, with nearly 22,000 women elected (including those returned unopposed). 
Recent developments, prospects and conclusions
In a study of five fragile countries Anten et al (2012) conclude that Pakistan offers the most detailed example of a process of decentralisation that has only partially achieved its objectives. This article echoes their concern that decentralisation cannot proceed effectively in a governance system that suffers from a number of dysfunctional factors. Achieving complete devolution of power in Pakistan is clearly a huge undertaking. Such institutional reforms are complex, time consuming and inevitably opposed by those interest groups which benefit from the existing system. For example, the effective diffusion of economic power is an essential prerequisite of meaningful devolution, and one that has perhaps received insufficient attention. Economic power notably that derived from ownership of land, gets parlayed into political power which, in collusion with other entrenched interest groups such as the bureaucracy, restricts the empowerment of citizens.
Decentralisation is inherently neither good nor bad. It is a means to an end. Successful decentralisation can improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector, and also contribute to significant social change, which cannot occur without supportive institutional development. At the local level, the DOPP brought about substantially enhanced participation of women in government, involvement of a broader cross-section of society in political life, and more educated, responsive and democratic leadership.
According to Anten et al (2012) , institutional reforms that do not align with the interests and incentives of power-holders are unlikely to lead to robust new arrangements. They argue that the World Bank's recent emphasis on an 'experimental best-fit' route to reform of the state is a sensible acknowledgement of these difficulties. Political factors are therefore crucial in determining the possibilities for reform and development especially in a fragile state environment. Strong political will and leadership are needed to create and maintain conducive conditions for a steady process of institutional change and development. In the case of DOPP, once the main architect of reform had departed the scene, progress came to a grinding halt, and the current political environment is uncertain.
We conclude that decentralisation cannot be approached as a stand-alone activity but must draw on and form part of a country's broader democratic and political culture. Parallel institutional development needs to be ongoing, and for this to occur supportive elements have to be designed and introduced in the constitutional framework and political system. Specifically, local government should not be regarded just as the lowest tier of the government, but as a distinct sphere that is closest to the citizens, with sufficient administrative and financial autonomy to serve its constituents. Unless these elements are institutionalized, the sustainability of decentralisation programs remains at risk. In 
